Modula 1
Lêpirsînê yekem raport û pêşniyarên xwe piştî lêkolîna xwe ya li ser 'Berxwedanî û amadekarî (Modula 1)' ya Keyaniya Yekbûyî roja Pêncşemê 18 Tîrmeh 2024 weşand.
Ew rewşa strukturên navendî û prosedurên Keyaniya Yekbûyî ji bo amadekariya acîl a pandemîk, berxwedan û bersivê vedikole.
| # | Recommendation | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | A simplified structure for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience |
Read the recommendation in fullHikûmetên Keyaniya Yekbûyî, Skotland, Wales û Irelandrlanda Bakur divê her yek hejmara strukturên bi berpirsiyariya amadekarî û avakirina berxwedêriyê li hember acîlên sivîl ên tevahî pergalê hêsan bikin û kêm bikin. Divê strukturên bingehîn ev bin:
Divê ev yek di nav 12 mehan de ji weşandina vê Raporê were kirin. Di nav 6 mehan de ji damezrandina koma karbidestên payebilind, divê ew vekolînek biqedîne da ku jimara strukturên ku berpirsiyarê amadehiya acîl a sivîl û berxwedêriya tevahî pergalê ne hêsan bike û kêm bike. Dûv re, di nav 24 mehan de ji weşandina vê Raporê, divê komîteya wezîran grûp û komîteyên bindest an piştgirîdar ên ku ji bo amadehiya acîl a sivîl a tevahî pergalê û berxwedêriyê berpirsiyar in, mentiqî û rêkûpêk bike. Her kom û komîteyên ku ji bo piştgirîkirina vê avahiya bingehîn hatine girtin an hatine afirandin, divê xwediyê armancek zelal bin û divê bi rêkûpêk derbarê pêşkeftin û temamkirina karên ku ji wan re hatine destnîşankirin rapor bikin. |
| 2 | Cabinet Office leadership for whole-system civil emergencies in the UK |
Read the recommendation in fullHikûmeta Brîtanya divê:
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| 3 | A better approach to risk assessment |
Read the recommendation in fullDivê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî û rêveberiyên veqetandî bi hev re li ser pêşxistina nêzîkatiyek nû ji bo nirxandina xetereyê bixebitin ku ji pêbaweriya li ser yek senaryoyên herî xirab ên maqûl dûr dikeve ber bi nêzîkatiyek ku:
Bi kirina vê yekê, divê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî û rêveberiyên veqetandî nirxandinên xetereyê bikin ku rewş û taybetmendiyên taybetî yên Îngilîstan, Wales, Skotland, Irelandrlanda Bakur û Keyaniya Yekbûyî bi tevahî nîşan dide. |
| 4 | A UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy |
Read the recommendation in fullDivê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî û rêveberiyên veqetandî bi hev re stratejiyek acîl a sivîl a tevahî-pergala Keyaniya Yekbûyî (ku pandemîk jî tê de) destnîşan bikin da ku pêşî li her rewşên awarte bigirin û her weha kêm bikin, kontrol bikin û bandorên wê jî kêm bikin. Bi kêmanî, stratejî divê:
Stratejî divê herî kêm her sê salan carekê ji nû ve were nirxandin da ku pê ewle bibe ku ew nûve û bandorker e, dersên ku di navbera ji nû ve nirxandinan de hatine derxistin têxe nav xwe. |
| 5 | Data and research for future pandemics |
Read the recommendation in fullHikûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî, ku bi rêveberiyên veqetandî re dixebite, divê mekanîzmayên ji bo berhevkirina biwext, analîzkirin, parvekirina ewledar û karanîna daneyên pêbawer ji bo agahdarkirina bersivên acîl, beriya pandemiyên pêşerojê saz bike. Divê pergalên daneyê di temrînên pandemîk de werin ceribandin. Divê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî di heman demê de pirfirehtir projeyên lêkolînê ku amade ne ku di bûyerek pandemîkek pêşerojê de dest pê bikin komîsyon bike. Dibe ku ev lêkolînên 'hibernated' an lêkolînên heyî yên ku hatine sêwirandin ku bi lez ji derketinek nû re werin adaptekirin bin. Divê bi hevkarên navneteweyî re xebatek çêtir were teşwîq kirin. Ev divê projeyên ji bo:
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| 6 | A regular UK-wide pandemic response exercise |
Read the recommendation in fullDivê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî û rêveberiyên veqetandî bi hev re bi kêmanî her sê salan carekê tetbîqatek bersivdayina pandemîk a li seranserê Keyaniya Yekbûyî pêk bînin. Divê temrîn:
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| 7 | Publication of findings and lessons from civil emergency exercises |
Read the recommendation in fullJi bo hemî tetbîqatên awarte yên sivîl, hukûmetên Keyaniya Yekbûyî, Skotland, Wales û Irelandrlanda Bakur divê her yek (heya ku sedemên ewlehiya neteweyî nebin ku wiya nekin):
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| 8 | Published reports on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience |
Read the recommendation in fullHikûmetên Keyaniya Yekbûyî, Skotland, Wales û Irelandrlanda Bakur divê her yek ji meclîsên xwe yên têkildar re herî kêm her sê salan carekê raporên li ser amadekarî û berxwedaniya awarte ya sivîl a tevahî pergalê amade bikin û biweşînin. Di raporan de herî kêm divê:
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| 9 | Regular use of red teams |
Read the recommendation in fullHikûmetên Keyaniya Yekbûyî, Skotland, Wales û Irelandrlanda Bakur her yek divê karanîna tîmên sor di Karûbarê Sivîl de destnîşan bikin da ku prensîb, delîl, polîtîka û şîretên têkildarî amadekarî û berxwedêriya li hember acîlên sivîl ên tevahî pergalê bişopînin û bişopînin. Tîmên sor divê ji derveyî hikûmetê û Karûbarên Sivîl werin birin. |
| 10 | A UK-wide independent statutory body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience |
Read the recommendation in fullDivê hukûmeta Keyaniya Yekbûyî, bi şêwirdarîya bi rêveberiyên desteserkirî re, saziyek serbixwe ya zagonî ji bo amadehiya acîl a sivîl a tevahî pergalê û berxwedanê ava bike. Divê saziya nû ji bo van berpirsiyariyan were dayîn:
Wek tedbîrek demkî, divê desteya nû li ser bingeheke neqanûnî di nav 12 mehan de piştî vê Raporê were damezrandin, da ku ew dest bi karê xwe bike berî ku yasa were derxistin. |
Lêpirsînê bersivên jêrîn li ser rapora Modula 1-ê ya li ser berxwedan û amadebûna Keyaniya Yekbûyî wergirt:
- Hikûmeta Brîtanya, 16 Çile 2025 hate wergirtin
- Hikûmeta Skotlandê, 16 Çile 2025 hate wergirtin
- Hikûmeta Welsh, 16 Çile 2025 hate wergirtin
- Rêveberê Îrlanda Bakur, 16 Çile 2025 hate wergirtin
Serok piştî wergirtina bersivên wan li ser rapora Modula 1 ji hemî hukûmetan re nivîsand:
- Nameya Serok ji Hikûmeta Brîtanya re, şandin 19 Adar 2025
- Nameya Serok ji Hikûmeta Skotlandê re, şandin 19 Adar 2025
- Nameya Serokatî ji Hikûmeta Welş re, şandin 19 Adar 2025
- Nameya Serok ji Rêvebirê Îrlanda Bakur re, şandin 19 Adar 2025
Modula 2
The Inquiry published its second report and recommendations following its investigation into the UK’s ‘Core decision-making and political governance (Module 2, 2A, 2B, 2C)’ on Thursday 20 November 2025.
It examines the initial response, central government decision making, political and civil service performance as well as the effectiveness of relationships with governments in the devolved administrations and local and voluntary sectors.
| # | Recommendation | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should reconstitute the role of the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland as an independent advisory role. The Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland should not have managerial responsibilities within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland). |
| 2 |
Attendance of the devolved administrations at SAGE meetings |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should invite the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to nominate a small number of representatives to attend meetings of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) from the outset of any future emergency. The status of those representatives as either ‘participant’ or ‘observer’ should depend upon their expertise and should be a matter for SAGE to determine. |
| 3 | Register of experts |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should develop and maintain a register of experts across the four nations of the UK who would be willing to participate in scientific advisory groups, covering a broad range of potential civil emergencies. |
| 4 |
Publication of technical advice |
Read the recommendation in fullDuring a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there are good reasons that prevent publication, such as commercial confidentiality, personal safety or national security, or because legal advice privilege applies. |
| 5 |
Support to participants in advisory groups |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include:
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| 6 |
Implementing a socio-economic duty |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government should bring into force in England section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, implementing the socio-economic duty. The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision within section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. |
| 7 |
Placing child rights impact assessments on a statutory footing |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government should introduce legislation to place child rights impact assessments on a statutory footing in England. The Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision. |
| 8 |
A framework for considering those at risk in an emergency |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by any steps taken to respond to a future pandemic. The framework should set out the specific steps that could be taken to mitigate the risks to these people. Equality impact assessments should form part of this framework. Where they cannot be undertaken in a national crisis, they should be reinstated as soon as possible. Each government should agree and publish in its response to this Report how it will ensure that this framework is embedded into emergency decision-making and who will be responsible for ensuring these issues remain under consideration throughout a national crisis. |
| 9 |
Delegated powers in Northern Ireland in an emergency |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider:
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| 10 |
Civil emergency decision-making structures |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4) how decision-making will work in a future pandemic. This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the emergency will be longer-term. It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK government which consist of:
The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group. The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups. It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland Executive. Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard. |
| 11 |
Contingency arrangements for key individuals |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government and the devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason. |
| 12 |
Taskforces |
Read the recommendation in fullThe response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes. In preparation, the UK government and the devolved administrations should each design the operating procedures for these taskforces, including, but not limited to, identifying the key roles needed to run the taskforces and how those roles would be appointed. The UK government should also identify the role of its taskforce in supporting decision-making procedures within the strategy and operational decision-making structures. These arrangements should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4). |
| 13 |
Amendment of the Ministerial Code in Northern Ireland |
Read the recommendation in fullThe Executive Office should amend the Ministerial Code to impose a duty of confidentiality on ministers that prohibits the disclosure of the individual views of ministers expressed during meetings of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee. |
| 14 |
Plans for accessible communications |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government and the devolved administrations should each develop action plans for how government communications will be made more accessible during a pandemic. As a minimum, these should include making provision for the translation of government press conferences into British Sign Language (and Irish Sign Language in Northern Ireland) and the translation of key announcements into the most frequently spoken languages in the UK. |
| 15 |
Scrutiny of emergency powers |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide- ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation. Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny. These safeguards should include:
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| 16 |
Review the applicability of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for future civil emergencies |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed. The review should:
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| 17 |
A central repository for restrictions and guidance |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should develop an online portal for use in future civil emergencies, where members of the public can access information on the legal restrictions that apply in their area and any associated guidance. This portal should be easily accessible and its content should be written in straightforward and unambiguous language. |
| 18 |
Attendance at meetings of COBR by representatives of the devolved administrations |
Read the recommendation in fullThe UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects. |
| 19 |
Intergovernmental structure and relations |
Read the recommendation in fullWhile intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as the transition away from COBR to nation-specific decision-making structures. This should meet regularly during a pandemic and be attended by all heads of government. Arrangements for these four-nations meetings should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4). |
The Inquiry has not yet received any responses to the Module 2 report on decision-making.
Monitoring of Inquiry Recommendations
Serok hêvî dike ku hemî pêşnîyarên pejirandî di wextê xwe de werin cîbicîkirin û cîbicîkirin.
Ji bo şefafî û vekirîbûnê, Lêpirsîn daxwaz dike ku saziya ku ji bo her pêşniyarê berpirsiyar e gavên ku ew ê di bersivê de bavêjin û dema kirina vê yekê biweşîne.
Heya ku wekî din neyê gotin, divê sazî di nav şeş mehan de ji weşandina pêşniyarê vê yekê bikin. Lêpirsînê pêvajoyek navxweyî pejirand da ku çavdêriya bi bandor a pêşnîyaran, ku li jêr bi hûrgulî tête peyda kirin.
Lêpirsîn dê ji saziyê re binivîsîne û jê bixwaze ku di nav sê mehên pêş de bersiva xwe biweşîne.
Ger bersivek neyê weşandin, Lêpirsîn dê nameyek din bişîne û ji saziyê bixwaze ku tavilê bersivek biweşîne.
Ger bersivek neyê weşandin, Lêpirsîn dê nameyek sêyemîn bişîne û xemgîniya Lêpirsînê destnîşan bike ku saziyê hêj bersiva xwe nedaye. Di Lêpirsînê de wê bi awayekî eşkere bê diyarkirin ku ji saziyê re nivîsiye.
If a response has not been published, the Inquiry will request that the institution sets out their reasons for not having done so. The Inquiry will publicly state that it has requested this information and the response received will be published on the Inquiry’s website.
The UK Government and devolved administrations will publish updates detailing their progress in implementing the Inquiry’s recommendations on a twice-yearly basis. These updates will be published every May and November, commencing in November 2026. Each update will include progress across all modules that have reported, provided that a minimum of five months has passed between the initial Government response deadline and the next scheduled May/November cycle.