Inquiry Recommendations

英国、苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰政府应各自简化和减少负责应对全系统民事紧急情况和增强应对能力的机构数量。

核心结构应该是：

• 设立一个内阁级或同等级别的部长级委员会（包括负责卫生和社会保健的高级部长），负责每个政府的全系统民事应急准备和恢复能力，该委员会定期开会，由相关政府的领导人或副领导人担任主席；
• 每个政府都有一个跨部门的高级官员小组（定期向内阁级或同等部长级委员会报告），负责监督和实施民事应急准备和恢复力政策。

该措施应在本报告发布后 12 个月内实施。

在高级官员小组成立后的六个月内，应完成一项审查，以简化和减少负责全系统民事应急准备和恢复能力的机构数量。

随后，在本报告发布后的 24 个月内，部长委员会应合理化和精简负责全系统民事应急准备和恢复能力的下属或支持小组和委员会。为支持这一核心结构而保留或创建的任何小组和委员会都应有明确的目标，并应定期报告分配给他们的任务的进展和完成情况。

英国政府和地方政府应共同努力，制定一种新的风险评估方法，不再依赖单一合理的最坏情况，而是采取以下方法：

• 评估代表不同风险的更广泛的情景以及每种风险的范围；
• 除了处理紧急情况的后果之外，还考虑预防和减轻紧急情况；
• 全面分析不同风险的综合影响可能如何使紧急情况复杂化或恶化；
• 除了评估短期风险之外，还评估长期风险并考虑它们如何相互作用；
• 对每种风险对弱势群体的影响进行评估；并
• 考虑到英国的能力和能力。

在此过程中，英国政府和地方权力下放行政部门应该进行风险评估，以反映英格兰、威尔士、苏格兰、北爱尔兰和整个英国的具体情况和特点。

英国政府和地方政府应共同推出全英国范围的民事应急战略（包括流行病），以预防各种紧急情况，并减少、控制和减轻其影响。

该策略至少应该：

• 适应性强；
• 包括针对每一种潜在的全系统民事紧急情况的部分——例如，一个关于大流行病的部分，清楚地解释英国政府、权力下放行政部门及其部门/理事会以及地方响应人员的角色和职责；
• 考虑每种紧急情况的多种潜在情况；
• 确定关键问题并列出一系列可能的应对措施；
• 确定如何应用该策略，以确保任何潜在的反应都与紧急情况的具体情况相称；
• 根据已发布的模型，对紧急情况对健康、社会和经济造成的潜在影响以及对民众（特别是弱势群体）可能采取的应急措施进行短期、中期和长期评估；以及
• 包括对英国有效应对紧急情况所需的基础设施、技术和技能的评估，以及这些需求在不同情况下可能如何变化。

该战略应至少每三年接受一次实质性重新评估，以确保其是最新的和有效的，并吸收重新评估期间获得的经验教训。

英国政府应与地方政府合作，建立及时收集、分析、安全共享和使用可靠数据的机制，以便在未来的流行病爆发之前为应急响应提供信息。数据系统应在流行病演习中进行测试。

英国政府还应委托开展更广泛的研究项目，以备未来发生大流行时启动。这些研究可以是“休眠”研究，也可以是旨在快速适应新疫情的现有研究。应鼓励与国际合作伙伴更好地合作。这应包括以下项目：

• 了解新病毒的流行情况；
• 衡量一系列不同公共卫生措施的有效性；以及
• 确定哪些弱势群体受疫情打击最严重以及原因。

英国政府和地方政府应至少每三年联合举行一次全英国范围的疫情应对演习。

演习应该：

• 测试英国范围内、跨政府、国家和地方对流行病各个阶段的应对措施，从最初的疫情爆发到多年的多波疫情；
• 包括广泛参与流行病防范和应对工作的人员；
• 思考一下一旦爆发大流行病，广大弱势群体将如何得到帮助。

对于所有民事紧急演习，英国、苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰政府应各自（除非因国家安全原因而不这样做）：

• 在演习结束后三个月内发布演习报告，总结调查结果、经验教训和建议；
• 发布行动计划，列出针对报告调查结果将采取的具体步骤，以及由哪个实体在行动结束后六个月内采取这些步骤；
• 将英国各地的演习报告、行动计划、应急计划和指导保存在英国范围的单一在线档案中，供所有参与应急准备、恢复和响应的人员访问。

英国、苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰政府应至少每三年向各自的立法机构提交并发布有关全系统民事应急准备和恢复能力的报告。

报告至少应包括：

• 各国政府已确认的风险可能会导致整个系统的民事紧急情况；
• 向各国政府提出的减轻这些风险的建议，以及这些建议是否被接受或拒绝；
• 成本效益分析，列出接受风险与采取行动减轻风险的经济和社会成本；
• 谁可能容易受到风险的影响以及正在采取哪些措施来减轻这些风险；
• 一份列出实施已接受建议的时间表的计划；以及
• 关于执行先前接受的建议的进展的最新情况。

英国、苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰政府应在公务员队伍中引入红队，以审查和质疑与全系统民事紧急情况的准备和恢复有关的原则、证据、政策和建议。红队应来自政府和公务员队伍之外。

英国政府应与地方政府协商，成立一个法定独立机构，负责全系统的民事应急准备和恢复工作。

新机构应承担以下职责：

• 为英国政府和地方政府提供独立的战略建议，帮助他们规划、准备并增强应对全系统民事紧急情况的能力；
• 与国家和地方各级的志愿者、社区和社会企业部门以及公共卫生主管进行磋商，以了解如何在整个系统民事紧急情况下保护弱势群体；
• 评估英国全系统民事紧急情况的规划、准备和恢复能力状况；以及
• 就应对全系统民事紧急情况所需的能力和能力提出建议。

作为一项临时措施，新机构应在本报告发布后 12 个月内以非法定形式成立，以便其能够在立法通过之前开始工作。

The Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should reconstitute the role of the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland as an independent advisory role. The Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland should not have managerial responsibilities within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland).

The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should develop and maintain a register of experts across the four nations of the UK who would be willing to participate in scientific advisory groups, covering a broad range of potential civil emergencies.

During a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there are good reasons that prevent publication, such as commercial confidentiality, personal safety or national security, or because legal advice privilege applies.

The Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include:

• clarity around the nature of an individual’s role and the extent of their responsibility, as well as the likely time commitment;
• payment where their time commitment means that they have to spend time away from their substantive role;
• access to support services; and access to advice on personal and online security, with procedures for escalating specific concerns.

The UK government should bring into force in England section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, implementing the socio-economic duty.

The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision within section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

The UK government should introduce legislation to place child rights impact assessments on a statutory footing in England.

The Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision.

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by any steps taken to respond to a future pandemic. The framework should set out the specific steps that could be taken to mitigate the risks to these people.

Equality impact assessments should form part of this framework. Where they cannot be undertaken in a national crisis, they should be reinstated as soon as possible.

Each government should agree and publish in its response to this Report how it will ensure that this framework is embedded into emergency decision-making and who will be responsible for ensuring these issues remain under consideration throughout a national crisis.

The Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider:

• the empowerment of the First Minister and deputy First Minister jointly to direct the work of other ministers and departments during an emergency;

• the empowerment of the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service in relation to the allocation of civil servants to departments or to civil contingency structures during an emergency; and

• how decisions that would usually be subject to ministerial approval would be taken should an emergency occur during the suspension of power-sharing arrangements.

The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4) how decision-making will work in a future pandemic.

This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the  emergency will be longer-term.

It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK government which consist of:

• a strategy group to set the overall approach to each stage of the pandemic and take decisions on major interventions (eg entering and exiting lockdown); and

• an operational group to take decisions on the implementation of the agreed strategy throughout the pandemic.

The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group.

The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups.

It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland

Executive.

Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.

The UK government and the devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason.

The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes. In preparation, the UK government and the devolved administrations should each design the operating procedures for these taskforces, including, but not limited to, identifying the key roles needed to run the taskforces and how those roles would be appointed.

The UK government should also identify the role of its taskforce in supporting decision-making procedures within the strategy and operational decision-making structures.

These arrangements should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).

The Executive Office should amend the Ministerial Code to impose a duty of confidentiality on ministers that prohibits the disclosure of the individual views of ministers expressed during meetings of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.

The UK government and the devolved administrations should each develop action plans for how government communications will be made more accessible during a pandemic.

As a minimum, these should include making provision for the translation of government press conferences into British Sign Language (and Irish Sign Language in Northern Ireland) and the translation of key announcements into the most frequently spoken languages in the UK.

The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide- ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation.

Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny. These safeguards should include:

• ‘sunset clauses’ for regulations made using the made affirmative procedure, specifying a clear expiration date, typically within two months; and

• a duty on ministers to report to their respective legislatures every two months on the exercise of emergency powers.

The UK government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed.

The review should:

• examine the conditions under which the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 may be invoked in a public health emergency;

• consider any adjustments to the Act’s safeguards, such as the triple lock test or time limits, that would make it more adaptable to pandemics; and

• produce clear guidance on the Act’s application for use in civil emergencies, including pandemics, to support its use as an emergency measure in advance of specific legislation – such as a dedicated pandemic bill – being passed.

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should develop an online portal for use in future civil emergencies, where members of the public can access information on the legal restrictions that apply in their area and any associated guidance.

This portal should be easily accessible and its content should be written in straightforward and unambiguous language.

The UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects.

While intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as the transition away from COBR to nation-specific decision-making structures. This should meet regularly during a pandemic and be attended by all heads of government.

Arrangements for these four-nations meetings should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).